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Abstract
This paper studies inattention to mortgage renancing incentives among Danish households.
Danish data are particularly suitable for this purpose because there are minimal barriers to
renancing, yet many borrowers fail to renance optimally, and the characteristics of these
borrowers can be accurately measured. The paper estimates a mixture model of household
renancing types in which household characteristics a¤ect both inattention (a low proportion
of rational renancers) and residual inertia (a low probability that fully inattentive house-
holds renance). Many characteristics move inattention and inertia in the same direction,
implying a positive cross-sectional correlation of 0.62 between these two household attributes.
Younger, better educated, and higher-income households have less inertia and less inatten-
tion. Financial wealth and housing wealth have opposite e¤ects, with the least inertia and
inattention among households whose housing wealth is high relative to their nancial wealth.
There is suggestive evidence of persistent unobserved heterogeneity in attention.
1 Introduction
A pervasive nding in studies of household nancial decisionmaking is that households re-
spond slowly to changing nancial incentives. Inaction is common, even in circumstances
where market conditions are changing continuously, and actions often occur long after the
incentive to take them has rst arisen. Well known examples include participation, sav-
ing, and asset allocation decisions in retirement savings plans and portfolio rebalancing in
response to uctuations in risky asset prices.2 This paper studies mortgage renancing, a
particularly important decision given the size of mortgages relative to householdsincome
and their other assets and liabilities.
A standard explanation for inaction is that action incurs xed costs, so that it should
only be undertaken when the benets are su¢ ciently large. (S,s) models of optimal inaction
in the presence of xed costs have been a staple of the economics literature since the 1950s.
More recently, the literature has considered costs of observing and processing information
that can potentially explain why households are inattentive to incentives, failing to take
action even outside the standard (S,s) inaction range.3
In this paper we estimate an empirical model of household inattention to mortgage re-
nancing incentives. The model has several important ingredients. First, it incorporates
a formula for the inaction range given xed costs of renancing, due to Agarwal, Driscoll,
and Laibson (ADL 2013). Second, we use a standard econometric formulation of stochastic
errors in discrete choice that e¤ectively smooths the ADL renancing threshold, implying a
rapid but not discontinuous increase in renancing probability around the threshold. Third,
2See for example Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002,
2004), and Madrian and Shea (2001) on retirement savings plans, and Bilias, Georgarakos, and Haliassos
(2010), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), and Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009a) on portfolio rebalancing.
3Observation costs are modeled by Du¢ e and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laibson (2002), Reis (2006),
and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007) among others. Sims (2003) uses the concept of entropy to model
information processing costs, an approach followed by Moscarini (2004) and Woodford (2009) among others.
Optimal behavior is hard to characterize in the presence of both standard xed costs and information
processing costs, since it typically involves a mix of time-dependent and state-dependent actions (Alvarez,
Lippi, and Paciello 2011, Abel, Eberly, and Panageas 2013). Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2012) make some
progress using data in which householdsobservations of nancial conditions are directly measured.
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we specify household behavior as a weighted average or mixture of fully attentive renancing
and completely inattentive renancing, thereby allowing continuous variation in household
inattention.4 We call fully attentive renancers levelheads, and following mortgage indus-
try slang and Deng and Quigley (2012), we call completely inattentive renancers wood-
heads. Fourth, the model allows inattentive renancing to take place at an arbitrary base
rate independent of incentives. A low level of this base renancing rate represents inertia,
or household reluctance to take action, for an inattentive woodhead household. Finally,
the model allows both inattention and inertia to vary cross-sectionally with household and
mortgage characteristics.
Almost all previous research on mortgage renancing has studied US data. Mortgage
prepayment behavior, and prepayment risk created by random time-variation in prepayment
rates, were the main preoccupations of a large literature on the pricing and hedging of US
mortgage-backed securities in the years before the global nancial crisis of the late 2000s.5
However US data are problematic in two respects. First, the US mortgage system constrains
renancing when households have negative home equity or impaired credit scores, and it
can be very di¢ cult to fully control for these constraints.6 Second, it is challenging to
measure borrower characteristics in the US system since these are reported only at the time
of a mortgage application through the form required by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA), and hence one cannot directly compare the characteristics of renancers and non-
renancers at a point in time. An alternative is to use survey data, but these can be
4Mixture models have a long history in statistics since Pearson (1894). A recent survey is presented in
McLachlan and Peel (2000). Two current applications where mixture models are used to uncover decision
rules are El-Gamal and Grether (1995) for Bayesian updating behavior, and Harrison and Rutström (2009)
for models of decision-making under risk.
5See for example Schwartz and Torous (1989), McConnell and Singh (1994), Stanton (1995), Deng,
Quigley, and Van Order (2000), Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001), and Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and
Vigneron (2007). Two important exceptions to the US focus of the prepayment literature are Miles (2004)
and Bajo, Barbi, and Bartoli (2014), which study the UK and Italy respectively.
6Johnson, Meier, and Toubia (2015) surmount this di¢ culty by studying pre-approved renancing o¤ers
from a large US nancial institution. Earlier attempts to control for constraints include Archer, Ling, and
McGill (1996), Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997), Campbell (2006), Schwartz (2006), and Keys, Pope, and
Pope (2014). In the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, the US government has tried to relax renancing
constraints through the Home A¤ordable Renance Program (HARP), but the e¤ectiveness of this program
remains an outstanding research question (Zandi and deRitis 2011, Tracy and Wright 2012, Zhu 2012).
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extremely noisy.7
We instead study a comprehensive administrative dataset on recent renancing decisions
in Denmark. The Danish mortgage system is similar to the US system in that long-term
xed-rate mortgages are common and can be renanced without penalties related to the
level of interest rates. However the Danish context has two special advantages that make
it ideal for measuring household inattention. First, Danish households are free to renance
whenever they choose to do so, even if their home equity is negative or their credit standing
has deteriorated, provided that they do not increase their outstanding principal balance.
This allows us to study household inattention and inertia without having to control for the
additional constraints that limit renancing in the US. Second, the Danish statistical sys-
tem provides us with accurate administrative data on household demographic and nancial
characteristics, for all mortgage borrowers including both renancers and non-renancers.
This allows us to characterize in great detail the cross-sectional determinants of inattention
and inertia.
Our main results are as follows. First, errors of omission, where households fail to
renance despite incentives greater than the ADL threshold for rational renancing, are much
more common in the Danish data than errors of commission, where households renance
too early at savings less than the ADL threshold.8 Along the observed path for Danish
interest rates, these errors of omission often involve substantial costs for households. Second,
inattention varies with numerous household demographic and nancial characteristics. It
is lower for young households with at least a high-school education, and decreases with
income and housing wealth but increases with nancial wealth. Third, the residual inertia of
inattentive households is not constant but positively correlated with inattention in the cross-
section. Demographic characteristics that predict less attention to incentives also typically
7See LaCour-Little (1999), Campbell (2006), Schwartz (2006), and Agarwal, Rosen, and Yao (2012) for
attempts to measure renancer characteristics using US data. Schwartz (2006) documents the poor data
quality of the American Housing Survey.
8We borrow this terminology from Agarwal, Rosen, and Yao (2012), who report similar results in US
data but can only study delays in renancing among renancers, since they do not have data on people who
fail to renance altogether. Keys, Pope, and Pope (2014) use data on outstanding mortgages to circumvent
this problem, but give up the ability to measure borrower characteristics contemporaneously.
3
predict a lower base rate of renancing. Fourth, there is suggestive evidence that attention
is a persistent household characteristic, not fully captured by observed demographics, so that
the history of renancing incentives for a cohort of mortgages a¤ects the attention level of
those mortgages that remain in the pool without having been renanced.
Our work ts into a broader literature on the di¢ culties households have in managing
their mortgage borrowing. Campbell and Cocco (2003, 2015) specify models of optimal
choice between FRMs and ARMs, and optimal prepayment and default decisions, showing
how challenging it is to make these decisions correctly. Chen, Michaux, and Roussanov
(2013) similarly study decisions to extract home equity through cash-out renancing, while
Bhutta and Keys (2013) and Khandani, Lo, and Merton (2013) argue that households used
cash-out renancing to borrow too aggressively during the housing boom of the early 2000s.
Bucks and Pence (2008) provide direct survey evidence that ARM borrowers are unaware
of the exact terms of their mortgages, specically the range of possible variation in their
mortgage rates. Woodward and Hall (2010, 2012) study the fees that borrowers pay at
mortgage origination, arguing that insu¢ cient shopping e¤ort leads to excessive fees.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the Danish mortgage
system and household data. Section 3 presents our mixture model of household renancing
types. Section 4 estimates the model empirically, and section 5 concludes. An online
appendix (Andersen, Campbell, Nielsen, and Ramadorai 2015) provides supporting details.
2 The Danish Mortgage System and Household Data
2.1 The Danish mortgage system
The Danish mortgage system has attracted considerable attention internationally because,
while similar to the US system in o¤ering long-term xed-rate mortgages without prepayment
penalties, it has numerous design features that di¤er from the US model and have performed
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well in recent years (Campbell 2013, Gyntelberg et al. 2012, Lea 2011). In this section we
briey review the funding of Danish mortgages and the rules governing renancing. (The
online appendix provides a few additional details on the Danish system.)
A. Mortgage funding
Danish mortgages, like those in some other continental European countries, are funded
using covered bonds: obligations of mortgage lenders that are collateralized by pools of
mortgages. The Danish market for covered mortgage bonds is the largest in the world, both
in absolute terms and relative to the size of the economy. The market value of all Danish
outstanding mortgage bonds in 2012 was DKK 2,456bn (EUR 330bn), exceeding the Danish
GDP of DKK 1,826bn (EUR 245bn).9
Mortgages in Denmark are issued by mortgage banks that act as intermediaries between
investors and borrowers. Investors buy mortgage bonds issued by the mortgage bank, and
borrowers take out mortgages from the bank. All lending is secured and mortgage banks
have no inuence (apart from the initial screening) on the yield on the loans granted, which
is entirely determined by the market. There is no direct link between the borrower and the
investor. Instead investors buy bonds that are backed by a pool of borrowers. If a borrower
defaults, the mortgage bank must replace the defaulted mortgage in the pool that backs the
mortgage bond. This ensures that investors are una¤ected by defaults in their borrower
pool so long as the mortgage bank remains solvent.
In the event of a borrower default, the mortgage bank can enforce its contractual right
by triggering a forced sale (foreclosure) which is carried through by the enforcement court,
part of the court system in Denmark. To the extent that the proceeds of a forced sale are
insu¢ cient to pay o¤ mortgages, uncovered claims are converted to personal claims held
by the mortgage bank against the borrower. In other words Danish mortgages (like those
elsewhere in Europe) have personal recourse against borrowers.
9Data from the European Covered Bonds Council show that the largest covered mortgage bond markets
in 2013 were, in order, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, France, and Germany. Germany had the largest overall
covered bond market, followed by Denmark and Spain.
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These features of the Danish system, together with strict regulation of mortgage loan-
to-value ratios, mortgage maturities, and housing valuation procedures, have led to unusual
stability of mortgage funding. There have been no mortgage bond defaults and only a few
cases of delayed payments to mortgage bond investors, the last of which occurred in the
1930s.
Danish mortgage bonds are currently issued by seven mortgage banks. While mortgages
on various types of real properties are eligible as collateral for mortgage bonds, mortgages
on residential properties dominate most collateral pools. Owner-occupied housing makes up
around 60% of mortgage pools, followed by around 20% for rental and subsidized housing.
Agriculture and commercial properties make up the remaining 20% of the market.
Traditionally the Danish system has been dominated by xed-rate mortgages, although
adjustable-rate mortgages have become more popular in the last 15 years. Badarinza,
Campbell, and Ramadorai (2015) report that the average share of adjustable-rate mortgages
in Denmark was 45% in the period 200313, with a standard deviation of 13%. At the
beginning of our sample period in 2009, the adjustable-rate mortgage share was about 40%.
B. Renancing
Fixed-rate mortgage borrowers in Denmark have the right to prepay their mortgages
without penalty. This is similar to the US system but di¤ers from another leading xed-
rate European mortgage system, the German system, where a xed-rate mortgage can only
be prepaid at a penalty that compensates the mortgage lender for any decline in interest
rates since the mortgage was originated. However the prepayment system in Denmark also
di¤ers from the US system in several important respects.
The Danish mortgage system imposes minimal barriers to any renancing that does not
cash out(in a sense to be made more precise below). Danish borrowers can renance their
mortgages to reduce their interest rate and/or extend their loan maturity, without cashing
out, even if their homes have declined in value so they have negative home equity. Related
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to this, renancing without cashing out does not require a review of the borrowers credit
quality.10 These features of the system imply that all mortgage borrowers can benet from
a decline in interest rates, even in a weak economy with declining house prices and consumer
deleveraging.
The mechanics of renancing in Denmark are as follows. The mortgage borrower must
repurchase mortgage bonds corresponding to the mortgage debt, and deliver them to the
mortgage lender. This repurchase can be done either at market value or at face value.
The option to renance at market value becomes relevant if interest rates rise; it prevents
lock-inby allowing homeowners who move to buy out their old mortgages at a discounted
market value rather than prepaying at face value as would be required in the US system. It
also allows homeowners to take advantage of disruptions in the mortgage bond market by
e¤ectively buying back their own debt if a mortgage-bond re sale occurs. In an environment
of declining interest rates such as the one we study, the option to renance at face value is
relevant.
An important point is that mortgage bonds in Denmark are issued with discrete coupon
rates, historically at integer levels such as 4% or 5%.11 This discreteness helps to ensure a
liquid market for mortgage bonds. Market yields, of course, uctuate continuously. Danish
mortgage bonds can never be issued at a premium to face value, since this would allow
instantaneous advantageous renancing, and normally are issued at a discount; in other
words, the market yield is somewhat above the discrete coupon at issue. This implies that
to raise, say, DKK 1 million for a mortgage, bonds must be issued with a face value which
is higher than DKK 1 million. Renancing the mortgage requires buying the full face value
of the bonds that were originally issued to nance it. Therefore the interest saving from
renancing in the Danish system is given by the spread between the coupon rate on the old
10Denmark does not have a system of continuous credit scores like the widely used FICO scores in the
US. Instead, there is what amounts to a zero/one scoring system that can be used to label an individual as
a delinquent borrower (dårlig betaler) who has unpaid debt outstanding. A delinquent borrower would
be unlikely to obtain a mortgage, but a borrower with an existing mortgage can renance, without cashing
out, even if he or she has been labeled as delinquent since the mortgage was taken out.
11More recently, bonds have been issued with non-integer coupons (2.5% and 3.5%) in response to the
current low-interest-rate environment.
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mortgage bond (not the yield on the mortgage when it was issued) and the yield on a new
mortgage.
An example may make this easier to understand. Suppose that a household requires
a loan of DKK 1 million (about $190,000 or EUR 130,000) in order to purchase a house.
Suppose that the market yield on a mortgage bond of the required term is 4.25%, but the
coupon rate on the bond is somewhat lower at 4%. As a result of this di¤erence between
the coupon rate and the market yield, the DKK 1 million loan must be nanced by issuing
bonds in the market with a face value which is higher than DKK 1 million (say DKK 1.1
million). The principal balance of the mortgage is initially DKK 1.1 million.
Now consider what happens if market yields drop to 3.25%. The borrower can renance
by purchasing the original mortgage bond at face value and delivering it to the mortgage
bank. To fund the purchase, the borrower will issue newmortgage bonds carrying the current
market yield of 3.25%, and a lower discrete coupon (3% in this example). The interest saving
from renancing is 4%   3:25% = 0:75%. This is the spread between the original coupon
rate at issuance and the current market yield, rather than the spread between the old and
new yields.
Since this transaction requires issuing a new mortgage bond with a market value of DKK
1.1 million and a face value above DKK 1.1 million, the principal balance of the mortgage
increases as a result of the renancing.12 However, it does not count as a cash-out renancing
provided that the market value of the newly issued mortgage bond is no greater than the
face value of the old mortgage bond.
Cash-out renancing does require su¢ ciently positive home equity and good credit status.
For this reason, cash-out renancing has been less common in Denmark in the period we
examine since the onset of the housing downturn in the late 2000s. In our dataset 26% of
renancings are associated with an increase in mortgage principal of 10% or more, enough
12This may be regarded as the Danish equivalent of pointsin the US system, cash paid up front to lower
the interest rate on a mortgage. The Danish system allows points to be borrowed, increasing the mortgage
principal balance. We thank Susan Woodward for pointing out this analogy.
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to classify these as cash-out renancings with a high degree of condence. In the paper we
present results that include these renancings, but in the online appendix we report broadly
similar results excluding them.
2.2 Danish household data
A. Data sources
Our dataset covers the universe of adult Danes in the period between 2008 and 2012,
and contains demographic and economic information. We derive data from ve di¤erent
administrative registers made available through Statistics Denmark.
We obtain mortgage data from the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks (Realkred-
itrådet) and the Danish Mortgage BanksFederation (Realkreditforeningen). The data cover
the 5 largest mortgage banks with an aggregated market share of 94.2% of the market value
of all mortgages in Denmark. The data contain the personal identication number of bor-
rowers, as well as a mortgage id, and information on the terms of the mortgage (principal,
outstanding principal, coupon, annual fees, maturity, loan-to-value, issue date, etc.) The
mortgage data are available annually from 2009 to 2011.
We obtain demographic information from the o¢ cial Danish Civil Registration System
(CPR Registeret). These records include the individuals personal identication number
(CPR), as well as their name; gender; date of birth; and the individuals marital history
(number of marriages, divorces, and history of spousal bereavement). The administrative
record also contains a unique household identication number, as well as CPR numbers of
each individuals spouse and any children in the household. We use these data to obtain
demographic information about the borrower. The sample contains the entire Danish pop-
ulation and provides a unique identifying number across individuals, households, and time.
We obtain income and wealth information from the o¢ cial records at the Danish Tax
Authority (SKAT). This dataset contains total and disaggregated income and wealth infor-
9
mation by CPR numbers for the entire Danish population. SKAT receives this information
directly from the relevant third-party sources, because employers supply statements of wages
paid to their employees, and nancial institutions supply information to SKAT on their cus-
tomersdeposits, interest paid (or received), security investments, and dividends. Because
taxation in Denmark mainly occurs at the source level, the income and wealth information
are highly reliable.
Some components of wealth are not recorded by SKAT. The Danish Tax Authority does
not have information about individualsholdings of unbanked cash, the value of their cars,
their private debt (i.e., debt to private individuals), pension savings, private businesses, or
other informal wealth holdings. This leads some individuals to be recorded as having negative
net nancial wealth because we observe debts but not corresponding assets, for example in
the case where a person has borrowed to nance a new car.
We obtain the level of education from the Danish Ministry of Education (Undervis-
ningsministeriet). This register identies the highest level of education and the resulting
professional qualications. On this basis we calculate the number of years of schooling.
Finally, we use data on medical treatments and hospitalizations from the Danish National
Board of Health (Sundhedsstyelsen) to calculate the total number of days in hospital during
the year. This dataset records medical treatments and discharges from hospitals.
B. Sample selection
Our sample selection entails linking individual mortgages to the household characteristics
of borrowers. We dene a household as one or two adults living at the same postal address.
To be able to credibly track the ownership of each mortgage we additionally require that
each household has an unchanging number of adult members over two subsequent years.
This allows us to identify 2,727,782 households in 2011 (2,709,486 in 2010 and 2,691,140
in 2009). Of these 2,727,782 households, we are able to match 2,494,621 households to
a complete set of information from the di¤erent registers. The main missing information
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for the remaining households pertains to their educational qualications, often missing on
account of verication di¢ culties for immigrants.
To operationalize our analysis of renancing, we begin by identifying households with a
single xed-rate mortgage. This is done in four steps. First we identify 953,099 households
with a mortgage in 2009. Second, to simplify the analysis, we focus on households with a
single mortgage throughout the sample period, leaving us with 702,834 households. Third,
we focus on households with xed-rate mortgages as these are the households who have
nancial incentives to renance when interest rates decline. This leaves us with 281,698
households for the 2009 to 2010 renancing decision, and 271,893 households for the 2010 to
2011 renancing decision. Thus, in total we have 553,591 household observations across the
two years. Finally, we expand the data to quarterly frequency using mortgage issue dates
reported in the annual mortgage data, giving us a total of 2,146,395 quarterly renancing
decisions.13
We observe a total of 84,111 renancings across the two years: 61,133 in 2010 and 22,978
in 2011. Of these, 39,878 renancings were from xed-rate to adjustable-rate mortgages,
and 44,233 from xed-rate to xed-rate mortgages (or in a minority of cases to capped
adjustable-rate mortgages which have similar properties to true xed-rate mortgages). We
treat both types of renancings in the same way and do not attempt to model the choice of
an adjustable-rate versus a xed-rate mortgage.14
Collectively, our selection criteria ensure that the renancings we measure are undertaken
for economic reasons. Renancing in our sample occurs when a household changes from one
xed-rate mortgage to another mortgage (whether it is xed- or adjustable-rate) on the
13This is less than the number of yearly observations times four (2,214,364), because some households
renance from a xed-rate mortgage to an adjustable-rate mortgage, and drop out of the sample in subsequent
quarters. Our imputation of quarterly renancings will be incorrect if a mortgage renances twice in the
same calendar year (since only the second renancing will be recorded at the end of the year), but we believe
this event to be exceedingly rare.
14The comparison of adjustable- and xed-rate mortgages is complex and has been discussed by Dhillon,
Shilling, and Sirmans (1987), Brueckner and Follain (1988), Campbell and Cocco (2003, 2015), Koijen, Van
Hemert, and Van Niewerburgh (2009), Johnson and Li (2014), and Badarinza, Campbell, and Ramadorai
(2015) among others.
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same property. Mortgage terminations that are driven by household-specic events, such as
moves, death, or divorce, are treated separately by predicting the probability of mortgage
termination, and using the tted probability as an input into the Agarwal, Driscoll, and
Laibson (2013) model of optimal renancing. This approach di¤ers from that of the US
prepayment literature, which seeks to predict all mortgage terminations regardless of their
cause.
C. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of Danish xed-rate mortgages, and households
propensity to renance them. These characteristics are broken out by the annual coupon
rate on the underlying mortgage bonds. In addition to the annual coupon, borrowers pay an
administration fee to the mortgage bank. This fee is roughly 70 basis points on average, and
depends on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on the mortgage, but is independent of household
characteristics.
The average xed-rate mortgage has an outstanding principal of DKK 905,000 (about
$173,000 or EUR 118,000) and 23.3 years to maturity by the end of 2009. The outstanding
principal corresponds to a loan-to-value ratio of 56.3% on average. From 2009 to 2010, 21.7%
of all xed-rate mortgages in our sample were renanced, 10.0% to adjustable-rate and 11.7%
to xed-rate mortgages. As expected, the renancing probability depends on the coupon rate
of the mortgage bond underlying the old mortgage. For mortgages with a coupon of 3% and
4% the propensities to renance are 3.9% and 5%, respectively.15 For mortgages with a 5%
coupon, which in 2009 accounted for roughly half of all xed-rate mortgages, the propensity
to renance is 20.3%. The propensities to renance are 55.6% and 43.7% for mortgages with
coupon rates of 6% and 7% or more, respectively.
In 2011 the propensity to renance was lower than in 2010. In total, only 8.5% of all xed-
rate mortgages were renanced, 3.7% to adjustable-rate and 4.8% to xed-rate mortgages.
15Mortgage bonds with a 3% coupon were issued in 2005 during a previous period of relatively low mortgage
rates. Most of the underlying mortgages for these bonds have a relatively low maturity of 10 years, or in
some cases 20 years. These mortgages account for only a very small fraction of our dataset.
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Still, we again see an increasing propensity to renance as the coupon rate increases. For
3% coupon mortgages the propensity to renance was a modest 3.1%, while the renancing
propensity for mortgages with a 6% coupon or higher lies between 11.7% and 15.9%.
Table 2 provides a comprehensive set of descriptive statistics for all households with a
xed-rate mortgage, as well as a comparison of household characteristics between renancing
and non-renancing households, measured in January of each year. Around 25% of all
households consist of a single member, and 64% are married couples. The remainder are
cohabiting couples. Around 41% of households have children living in the household. Table
2 also reports that 1.0% of households got married, 4.2% experienced the birth of a child,
and 3.6% experienced a negative health shock during the last year. We dene a negative
health shock as occurring whenever a member of a household receives medical treatment at
a hospital (on an inpatient or outpatient basis) on 5 days or more during the last year, and
received such treatment on fewer than 5 days in the year before.
We also have direct measures of nancial literacy, dened as a degree in nance or
economics, or professional training in nance, for at least one member of the household. 4.6%
of households are nancially literate in this strong sense. A larger fraction of households,
12.9%, have members of their extended family (including non-resident parents, siblings, in-
laws, or children) who are nancially literate.
In our empirical analysis we use demeaned ranks of age, education, income, nancial
wealth, and housing wealth rather than the actual values of these variables. A table in the
appendix reports selected percentiles of the underlying distribution for all households, and
separately for renancing and non-renancing households.
Columns 2 to 7 of Table 2 report di¤erences in household characteristics between re-
nancing and non-renancing households in the full sample (column 2), the years 2010 and
2011 (columns 3 and 4), and subsamples of more highly educated (top quartile), married,
and wealthier (top quartile) households (columns 5 to 7). A positive number means that
the average characteristic is larger for renancing households than for non-renancing house-
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holds. The di¤erences between renancers and non-renancers are generally robust across
subsamples. For example, renancing households are more likely to be married and less
likely to be single, more likely to have children, to get married, and to experience the birth
of a child, and less likely to have a negative health shock. Our measures of nancial literacy
are also higher for renancing households.
Some important patterns emerge in the comparison of ranked variables across renancers
and non-renancers. Renancers are younger and better educated, and have higher income
and housing wealth but lower nancial wealth. The appendix shows that the same patterns
appear when we estimate logit renancing models that include all demographic variables
simultaneously with renancing incentives. We now develop a mixture model that can be
used to explore such e¤ects in greater detail.
3 A Model of Renancing Types
3.1 A mixture model of renancing
A. Renancing conditional on household type
Consider a model of mortgage choice in which the likelihood of observing a household i
renancing its xed-rate mortgage at time t (the event yi;t = 1) is determined by the type of
the household h (a main target of our modelling e¤orts), which a¤ects householdsperceived
nancial incentives to renance Ih(zi;t), and a standard logistic distributed stochastic choice
error i;t following Luce (1959).
In the model, households of type h have a probability of renancing given by:
phi;t(yi;t = 1jh; h) = phi;t(h + ehIh(zi;t) + i;t > 0): (1)
In the above equation, zi;t contains both mortgage characteristics as well as household char-
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acteristics si;t, which together determine the households perceived nancial incentives to
renance. h is the baseline probability of renancing for households of type h: h captures
the reaction to incentives, modelled as an exponent to ensure that households react non-
perversely to incentives, as higher incentives always lead to an increase in the probability of
renancing for any value of h.
This specication implies that the likelihood contribution of each choice of household
type h is:
Lhi;t(h; h) = 
 
[2yi;t   1][h + ehIh(zi;t)]

; (2)
where (:) is the inverse logistic function, (x) = ex=(1 + ex). For a single type, this model
of household choice underlies the commonly used logit regression.
B. Household characteristics and mixing proportions
Our model considers households i as a mixture of proportions of these di¤erent types,
each with a mixing weight 0 < hi < 1, constructed such that total weights for each household





We can now specify the likelihood contribution for household i as a nite mixture of
proportions. This can also be interpreted as each household having a probability hi of being
type h:















We allow for observable household characteristics to inuence the relative weights on the
di¤erent types, specifying hi = 
0
hsit, where as before, sit captures household demographic
characteristics.
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This leads to the household i log likelihood function over our sample specied as:












A. Levelheads and woodheads
We dene two di¤erent types of households, levelheads (type h = L) and woodheads
(type h = W ), who di¤er in their values of h and h, as well as in the incentives Ih(zi;t)
that they perceive. Levelheads are approximately rational, while woodheads are inattentive
to renancing incentives (we borrow their name from Deng and Quigley 2012, and from
mortgage industry slang).
Woodheads ignore incentives and renance at a constant rate W . To represent this
behavior we set IW (zi;t) and W to zero. We allow W to vary with household demographic
characteristics si;t.
Levelheads respond solely to the incentives that they perceive, and have no base rate of
renancing that is not contingent on incentives. To represent this behavior we set L to zero.
We estimate a levelhead sensitivity to incentives L, a xed number that does not vary with
demographic characteristics.
To illustrate the implications of this model, Figure 1 plots renancing probabilities against
incentives estimated in our Danish data set, using the simplest possible mixture model in
which demographic characteristics play no role. A zero incentive is dened as the interest
saving at which a levelhead household has a 50% probability of renancing. The levelhead
renancing probability, shown as a dot-long dashed line, is symmetric around the zero in-
centive, increasing rapidly from near zero at a negative incentive of about -1% to almost
one at a positive incentive of about 1%. The woodhead renancing probability, shown as
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a dot-short dashed line, is constant at slightly less than 1% regardless of the level of the
incentive. The estimated fraction of levelheads is 12%, so the overall estimated renancing
probability is the dashed line which is slightly less than 13% even at very high incentive
levels. The empirically observed renancing probability in our dataset is shown as the solid
line.
B. Levelhead renancing incentives
To measure the incentives to which levelheads respond, we follow ADL (2013). The
incentive is the di¤erence between the coupon rate on the mortgage bond corresponding to
the current mortgage Coldit , less the interest rate on a new mortgage Y
new




i;t   Y newi;t  Oh(zi;t). (6)
The function Oh(zit) captures a variety of costs associated with renancing. For lev-
elheads, this function takes the xed costs of renancing into account, but in addition, it
captures the option value of waiting for further interest-rate declines. We measure this











 = 1 +  (+ i;t)
i;t
mi;t(1  ) : (9)
HereW (:) is the LambertW -function, mi;t is the size of the mortgage for household i at time
t, i;t is the expected exogenous rate of decline in the real value of the mortgage, and i;t is
the xed cost of renancing. All of these parameters can in principle vary across households.
Marketwide parameters include the volatility of the interest rate , the marginal tax rate 
17
that determines the tax benet of mortgage interest deductions, and the discount rate .16
Following ADL we dene i;t and i;t as
i;t = i;t +
Y old
i;t
exp(Y oldi;t Ti;t)  1
+ t; (10)
it = f: (11)
Here 
i;t
can be interpreted as the probability of exogenous mortgage termination, Y old
it
is the
yield on the households pre-existing (old) mortgage, Ti;t is the number of years remaining
on the mortgage, t is the ination rate, and f is the xed cost of renancing. Our initial
model uses a mixture of the recommended parameters in ADL and sensible values given the
Danish context, i.e.,  = 0:0074;  = 0:33;  = 0:05, and f = DKK 10; 000 (about $1,900
or EUR 1,300). t is set equal to realized consumer price ination over the past year, a
standard proxy for expected ination that varies between 2.0% and 3.0% during our sample
period.
To allow for a more realistic measurement of i;t, we estimate i;t at the household level
using additional data. Mortgage termination can occur for many reasons, including the
household relocating, experiencing a windfall and paying down the principal amount, selling
the property, or simply because the household ceases to exist because of death or divorce.
(We exclude renancing from the denition of mortgage termination.) Without seeking
to di¤erentiate these causes, to estimate i;t we use all households with a single xed-rate
mortgage, and estimate, for each year in the sample:
i;t = Pr(Termination) = p(
0si;t + i;t > 0); i;t  N(0; ); (12)
using the same vector si;t of household characteristics. We use the predicted termination
16Although the Danish tax system is progressive, the tax benet of mortgage interest deductions is calcu-
lated at a xed tax rate. ADL also present an approximation to the solution (7) that does not require the
use of the Lambert W -function. We used the approximation in the rst draft of this paper, but found that
its accuracy deteriorates unacceptably for mortgages with higher ADL thresholds.
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probabilities from this model for each household i at time t to construct i;t.
Figure 2 shows a histogram of the estimated mortgage termination probabilities, with a
red line showing the position of the ADL suggested hardwired level of 10% per annum.
The mean of our estimated termination probabilities is 10.6%, larger than the median of
7.5% because the distribution of termination probabilities is right-skewed. The standard
deviation of this distribution is 9.2%.
Finally, we note two minor limitations of the ADL formula in our context. First, it gives
us the incentive for a household to renance from a xed-rate mortgage to another xed-
rate mortgage. Some households in our sample renance from xed-rate to adjustable-rate
mortgages, implying that they perceive a new ARM as even more attractive than a new
FRM. We do not attempt to model this decision here but simply use the ADL formula for
all initially xed-rate mortgages and renancings, whether or not the new mortgage carries
a xed rate.
Second, the ADL formula ignores the fact, unique to the Danish system, that renancing
may increase the mortgage principal balance because the coupon on the new mortgage bond
is lower than the market yield. This increase in the mortgage principal has no economic e¤ect
except in the event that interest rates decline further in the future, leading the household to
consider renancing the new mortgage.17 The value of the renancing option attached to
the new mortgage is determined by the new mortgage bond coupon, and is lower than that
assumed by the ADL formula whenever that coupon is lower than the current market yield, in
other words whenever the mortgage principal increases. Fortunately this e¤ect is extremely
small, as shown by ADL in a comparison of their formula with an earlier analysis by Chen and
Ling (1989). The chief di¤erence between the two papers is that Chen and Lings baseline
calculations exclude the possibility of subsequent renancings. The di¤erence between the
ADL and Chen-Ling thresholds is therefore an upper bound on the e¤ect of principal balance
17Importantly, the principal balance does not play any special role in the event of mortgage default. Even
in delinquency, the household has the option to pay the market value or the face value of the mortgage
bond, whichever is lower. Note also that delinquency is rare in Denmark, a¤ecting only about 0.5% of the
households in our sample.
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increase in the Danish system. Equating their parameters to Chen and Lings values, ADL
nd that the threshold di¤erence is only 10 basis points (on a base of 218 basis points) when
the renancing cost is 2 points. This di¤erence is small enough that it would make no
meaningful di¤erence to any of our empirical ndings.18
C. Dynamic e¤ects
There are several reasons why the weights on di¤erent household types may depend on
the date at which a households mortgage was issued and the date at which the renancing
decision is observed. There may be pure time e¤ects of the current date, for example if the
population of mortgage borrowers becomes more aware of rational prepayment policy over
time. There may be pure mortgage age e¤ects if households avoid renancing mortgages
in the rst few quarters after issue, or if they become less attentive to mortgages that
have been outstanding for many years. The literature on prepayment modeling for US
households, where demographic characteristics are not observed, pays particular attention
to such mortgage age e¤ects (see for example Kang and Zenios 1992, Stanton 1995, or Hall
2000).
There may also be e¤ects resulting from changes over time in the type composition of a
particular cohort of mortgages. To understand this, consider two alternative extreme views
about type assignment in our model. One extreme view is that each household draws a
new type assignment each period, from a xed distribution determined by its demographic
characteristics. Given these characteristics, the probability of being a woodhead does not
depend on the past behavior of the household; even if a household has failed to renance for
many periods, this does not make it any more likely to be a woodhead this period. According
to this view, woodhead and levelhead behavior are temporary states, akin to being asleep or
awake, rather than persistent conditions.
18Chen and Lings parameter values are close enough to those in our paper for this comparison to be
relevant. Their value of = (1  ) is 2, while ours is 1.5, implying that our thresholds are slightly smaller
than theirs. Their calibrated annual interest rate volatility is 0.012, whereas ours is 0.0074, but this di¤erence
has an ambiguous e¤ect on the value of future renancing options, because lower interest rate volatility lowers
the renancing threshold but also lowers the probability that any xed threshold will be hit in the future.
We thank Susan Woodward for highlighting this issue.
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The opposite extreme view is that woodhead and levelhead behavior are permanent
characteristics of individual households. If this is the case, then past behavior and past
incentives which drive levelhead behavior should alter the conditional probability that a
household is one or the other type. Specically, during periods of positive renancing
incentives driven by declining interest rates, levelheads should renance more rapidly than
woodheads. With permanent type assignments, the remaining population of outstanding
mortgages will have a higher fraction of woodheads in the future. Conversely, the fraction of
woodheads declines during periods of negative renancing incentives when only woodheads
renance.
Our ability to identify such dynamic e¤ects is limited in several respects. There is the
general problem that age, time, and cohort e¤ects can never be identied in a panel without
the application of some theoretical restrictions. And there is the more specic problem that
we observe only two years of renancing decisions. Given these limitations, we proceed
informally by including in our vector of household characteristics a set of dummies for the
quarter of mortgage issuance and the current quarter. (Dummies for the interaction of
issuing quarter and current quarter add many coe¢ cients but almost no explanatory power,
so we exclude them.) We then interpret the patterns of coe¢ cients on these dummies in
the light of these theories of mortgage renancing behavior.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Renancing incentives
During our sample period Danish mortgage rates declined from the levels that had prevailed
in the late 2000s, back to levels last seen in 2005. This pattern is illustrated by Figure
3, which plots the history of 30-year Danish mortgage rates from 2003. In the middle of
2010 the mortgage rate bottomed out just above 4%, before rising back above 5% in early
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2011, and then declining again to below 4% later in the year, and even further through
2012. Throughout our data analysis, we treat each quarter as a single observation, and
use the minimum weekly average mortgage rate during the quarter to calculate renancing
incentives.
Table 3 summarizes the cross-sectional distribution of renancing incentives. The top
panel of the table shows the interest rate spread between the coupon rate on the mortgage
bond corresponding to the old mortgage, less the currently available mortgage rate. To
ensure that we match old to new mortgages appropriately, we match using the remaining
tenure on the old mortgage, within 10-year bands. That is, in each quarter, for mortgages
with 10 or fewer years to maturity, we use the average 10 year mortgage bond yield to
compute incentives, and for remaining tenures between 10-20 years (>20 years) we use the
average 20 year (30 year) bond yield. These 10, 20, and 30 year yields are calculated as
value-weighted averages of yields on all newly issued mortgage bonds with maturities of 10,
20, and 30 years, respectively.
The median interest spread computed in this fashion was 19 basis points in 2010 and
45 basis points in 2011, with wide cross-sectional variation. In 2010, for example, the 5th
percentile of the interest rate spread was roughly 100 basis points, while the 95th percentile
was 182 basis points.
The second panel of the table reports the ADL (2013) threshold that justies renancing.
The median threshold is 106 basis points in 2010 and 110 basis points in 2011, but once again
there is wide cross-sectional variation, from 60 basis points at the 5th percentile to 283 basis
points at the 95th percentile in 2010. The cross-sectional distribution of thresholds is right-
skewed because, in the presence of xed renancing costs, a very high interest saving is
needed to justify renancing a small mortgage or a mortgage with only a few years left to
maturity.
The third panel subtracts the ADL threshold from the interest rate spread for each mort-
gage to calculate the overall renancing incentive perceived by rational (levelhead) mortgage
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borrowers. The median incentive was negative at 85 basis points in 2010 and 93 basis
points in 2011, indicating that most mortgage borrowers should not have renanced in these
years. However, just over 21% of mortgage-quarters in our sample have positive renancing
incentives. The 95th percentile incentive was 53 basis points in 2010 and 44 basis points in
2011.
4.2 Errors of commission and errors of omission
A simple way to use these estimates is to calculate the incidence of renancing mistakes.
These fall into two main categories. Borrowing the terminology of Agarwal, Rosen, and Yao
(2012), errors of commissionare renancings that occur at an interest-rate saving below
the ADL threshold, while errors of omissionare failures to renance that occur above the
ADL threshold.
Table 4 reports the frequency of these two types of error. We dene an error of com-
mission as a renancing with an interest rate saving below the ADL threshold less k%, and
an error of omission as a household-quarter where a renancing does not occur even though
the interest saving is above the ADL threshold plus k%. The additional error cuto¤ level
of k percentage points is introduced to take account of uncertainty in the ADL threshold.
For a given k, households are classied as making errors of omission if they fail to renance
when incentives are greater than k, and errors of commission if they renance with incentives
less than  k, while incentives between  k and k cannot generate either kind of error. In
addition, we classify a renancing as an error of commission only if the renancing does not
involve cash-out or maturity extension, since these alterations in mortgage terms could be
su¢ ciently advantageous to justify renancing even at a modest interest saving below the
ADL threshold.
Table 4 shows that in our sample period, far more household-quarters have negative
renancing incentives (1,688,215 household-quarters in the case of k = 0) than have positive
renancing incentives (458,180 in the case of k = 0). However, within the large rst group
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errors of commission are relatively rare, occurring slightly more than 1% of the time for
error thresholds k = 0 or k = 0:25. Within the small second group errors of omission are
extremely common, occurring almost 90% of the time for k = 0 and 87% of the time for
k = 0:25.
While these numbers reect a count of household-quarters rather than households, so that
renancing delays of a few quarters generate several errors of omission, the high incidence of
errors of omission is nonetheless striking. It is consistent with the fact that we observe some
large positive renancing incentives in our dataset, which we could not do unless there had
been errors of omission before the start of our sample period. To illustrate this point, Figure
4 plots the history of renancing activity in relation to the currently available mortgage rate,
dividing households by the coupon rate on their old mortgage bond. The gure illustrates
the prevalence of errors of omission, as we can see a small fraction of households even in
late 2011 still renancing out of 7% mortgages despite the sharp dips in interest rates in
2010 and the overall low levels of interest rates. However, movements in interest rates do
stimulate renancing activity as we see from the renancing spikes in the early part of 2010.
These results support the focus of the literature on errors of omission, but also motivate the
more careful econometric analysis of the determinants of renancing that we undertake in
the next section, distinguishing inattention and inertia using our mixture model.
Table 5 relates errors of commission and errors of omission to demographic characteristics
of households. The left hand panel of the table has an error cuto¤ of k = 0, while the right
hand panel sets k = 0:25. In each column of the table, we report the mean di¤erence for
each of the demographic characteristics listed in the rows, between renancing and non-
renancing households. Positive (negative) numbers under columns marked Increases in
Errors of Commissionsignify demographic characteristics which are associated with shifts of
household-quarters into (out of) such errors, and similarly positive (negative) numbers under
columns marked Reductions in Errors of Commissionsignify demographic characteristics
which are associated with shifts of household-quarters out of (into) such errors.
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Almost all the household characteristics shown in Table 5 shift the renancing probability
in the same direction regardless of the incentive. Therefore characteristics such as marriage
and education that reduce the incidence of errors of omission also increase the incidence of
errors of commission. This suggests that household characteristics have an important e¤ect
on the baseline probability of renancing, as well as the attention to incentives, a result that
we indeed nd when we estimate our more structural mixing model of renancing behavior.
In Table 6, we attempt to quantify the costs of errors of omission in a simple fashion.
A full analysis would require simulating interest rates, using either the interest rate process
assumed by ADL or an empirical model of Danish interest dynamics. One would then track
mortgages along simulated interest paths, calculating the mortgage interest and renancing
costs along each path for each possible renancing threshold, and nally average across paths
to measure the ex ante cost of a suboptimal renancing policy. However, such an analysis
would take us far aeld from our empirical orientation in this paper.
Accordingly, we undertake a much simpler empirical exercise to calculate the realized
excess interest paid on mortgages above the ADL threshold, net of renancing costs. For
each mortgage with an interest saving above the ADL threshold in each quarter, we calculate
the di¤erence between the interest paid on that mortgage, and the interest it would pay
if it renanced and rolled the xed renancing cost into the principal. We then divide
by mortgage principal on these mortgages (in the top panel) or by total principal of all
outstanding mortgages (in the bottom panel) and present averages for 2010, 2011, and the
two years together.
Table 6 shows that along the realized path for Danish interest rates, errors of omission
cost the households making them almost 1.5% on average in our sample period, if we assume
a zero tolerance threshold k. As we increase k, we identify more serious errors and the
costs rise, to 1.9% with k = 0:25, 2.1% with k = 0:5, and 4.0% with an extreme k = 2.
Relative to the entire Danish mortgage market, these costs are 36 basis points with a zero
k, 26 basis points with k = 0:25, 21 basis points with k = 0:5, and only 2 basis points if we
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go to the extreme k = 2. The decline in estimated costs relative to the entire market, as
we increase k, is due to the fact that more extreme errors are less common, so while they
have serious consequences for a few borrowers they are not as consequential in the Danish
mortgage system as a whole.
While these numbers admittedly come from simple calculations conditional on a single
path for interest rates, they suggest that errors of omission can have substantial costs. This
nding is consistent with evidence reported in Miles (2004), Campbell (2006), Agarwal,
Rosen, and Yao (2012), and Keys, Pope, and Pope (2014).
4.3 Mixture models
A. Model comparisons
The rst column of Table 7 estimates a baseline mixture model with a constant re-
nancing probability for woodheads and a constant proportion of levelheads (and therefore
of woodheads) in the population. A low proportion of levelheads indicates that the popula-
tion is relatively inattentive to incentives, and a low renancing probability for woodheads
indicates a high level of inertia, controlling for the level of attention.
The estimated model, illustrated earlier in Figure 1, implies that woodheads renance
each quarter with probability 0.9%, and 85% of the population are woodheads. The remain-
ing 15% are levelheads, who renance with probability 10% when the incentive is -0.88%
(that is, when the raw interest spread is 0.88% lower than the ADL threshold), 25% when
the incentive is -0.43%, 50% when the incentive is zero, 75% when the incentive is 0.43%,
and 90% when the incentive is 0.88%. This model has a pseudo-R2 statistic of 9.7%.
The next two columns of Table 7 allow demographic characteristics, as well as issuing-
quarter, current-quarter, and mortgage issuer dummies, to shift rst the woodhead renanc-
ing probability only and then the proportion of levelheads only.
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Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009) report that age has a nonlinear e¤ect
on many nancial decisions, with nancial sophistication increasing among younger people
as they gain experience, and decreasing among older people perhaps because of cognitive
decline. Education, income, and nancial and housing wealth may also have di¤erent ef-
fects among less educated and poorer people than among better educated and richer people.
We therefore want to allow for nonlinear e¤ects of the ranked variables on renancing prob-
abilities. The appendix shows that results are quite similar whether we do this using a
piecewise linear function with a kink at the median (achieved by adding the absolute value
of the demeaned rank to the regression), or using a quadratic function (by adding twice the
squared demeaned rank, a normalization that allows direct comparison of the coe¢ cients in
the two specications). Accordingly we proceed with the quadratic specication and report
these results in Table 7.
We see very similar patterns of demographic e¤ects on both the woodhead renancing
probability and the proportion of levelheads. Demographic characteristics that change the
baseline renancing probability of woodheads almost always change the fraction of levelheads
in the demographic group in the same direction. Only a few e¤ects, notably the nonlinear
e¤ect of housing wealth, seem to be meaningfully di¤erent across these two models.
The nal two columns of Table 7 report a single model in which we allow household char-
acteristics and mortgage dummies to inuence both the woodhead renancing probability
and the proportion of levelheads simultaneously. This is the main model we use to interpret
renancing behavior among Danish households, and we now examine its properties in detail.
To illustrate the t of this model, in Figure 5 we show the sample distribution of in-
centives, together with the observed sample renancing probability at each incentive level.
As previously discussed, most incentives are negative but the renancing probability in-
creases strongly around the zero level, peaking at an incentive slightly above 1%. Very few
observations have positive incentives greater than this, so the observed sample renancing
probability at high incentive levels is based on limited data and is correspondingly noisy.
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In Figure 6 we show the observed renancing probability together with the models
predicted renancing probability and the estimated fraction of levelheads in the mortgage
pools with each incentive level. The model captures the runup in renancing probability
well until an incentive of about 0.8%. Above this level it continues to track the spikes
and dips in renancing probability, but does not capture their magnitudes. The fraction
of levelheads in the population is estimated to be largest among mortgages with incentives
between -1% and 2% (the great bulk of the distribution illustrated in Figure 5), and lower
in the extreme right tail of the incentive distribution.
B. Demographic e¤ects
The demographic e¤ects we estimate in our mixture model are broadly consistent with
those discussed earlier using simpler statistics. To show more clearly the e¤ects of the
ranked variables age, education, income, nancial wealth, and housing wealth we present
two gures that show the marginal estimated e¤ect of the variable on the probability that
a household is a levelhead (Figure 7) and on the woodhead renancing probability (Figure
8).19
Figure 7 shows that age has a negative e¤ect on the levelhead probability among younger
households. Controlling for other demographic characteristics, the youngest households are
almost 4% more likely to be levelheads than middle-aged or older households.20 Education
has a modest positive e¤ect on the levelhead probability.
Income has a hump-shaped e¤ect on the levelhead probability, peaking at about the
70th percentile of income; nancial wealth has a negative e¤ect, particularly among poorer
19Figures in the appendix illustrate the total e¤ects of each variable (that is, the average estimated
levelhead probability and estimated woodhead renancing probability for households in each percentile of
the distribution, taking account of the changes in all other demographic characteristics that are associated
with the change in the ranked variable of interest).
20The appendix shows that the age e¤ect is somewhat weaker if we estimate a model with an ADL incentive
calculated from a xed moving probability, as in ADL, rather than a household-specic moving probability.
The reason is that young households are more likely to move, so their ADL thresholds are higher; neglecting
this e¤ect makes young households appear more likely to be woodheads. The appendix also shows that the
age e¤ect is somewhat weaker if we exclude cash-outs and maturity extensions, because younger households
are more likely to undertake these sorts of renancing.
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households; and housing wealth has a positive e¤ect among households with higher-valued
homes. These patterns are consistent with a tradeo¤ between increased sophistication
among households with higher income and wealth, and reduced signicance of mortgage
costs among households with high income and nancial wealth relative to housing wealth.
Figure 8 shows that the woodhead renancing probability declines with age among
younger households, is relatively little a¤ected by education, income or housing wealth,
and declines strongly with nancial wealth. A comparison of Figures 7 and 8, and the
numbers reported in Table 7, highlight that many of the estimated demographic e¤ects shift
the baseline renancing probability and the proportion of levelheads in the same direction.
The correlation between these variables is 0.62 in the full dataset, but we can reject the
hypothesis that this correlation is perfect.
In summary, Danish household renancing behavior cannot be described by a simple
model in which only attention to incentives varies across households. As attention dimin-
ishes (captured here by a lower levelhead probability), households converge to a baseline
renancing probability that also depends on demographics, and which tends to be lower in
demographic groups that pay less attention to incentives. In other words, inattention and
inertia are positively correlated in the cross section.
However, the correlation of these household attributes is not perfect. Some demographic
e¤ects operate di¤erently on inattention and inertia: for example, single males pay greater
attention to incentives but also have greater residual inertia, while negative health shocks
increase inertia without reducing attention. Income and education increase attention among
lower-income and less educated households, but have only very weak e¤ects on inertia. Be-
cause of such divergent demographic e¤ects, we can reject a model that imposes proportion-
ality between inattention and inertia, despite the positive cross-sectional correlation between
these variables.
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C. Issuing-quarter and current-quarter e¤ects
Figures 9 and 10 plot the estimated coe¢ cients on issuing-quarter dummies, for the
woodhead renancing probability and the probability that a household is a levelhead, re-
spectively. The woodhead renancing probability in Figure 9 rises for about three years
and then remains fairly at on average, although with substantial uctuations around that
average. This shape is broadly consistent with the PSA model established by the Pub-
lic Securities Association as a benchmark description of US prepayment behavior, in which
prepayments increase linearly during the rst 31 months of mortgage life and remain at
thereafter (Veronesi 2010, p. 296 and Figure 8.5).21
The levelhead probability in Figure 10 is generally declining with the age of the mortgage,
but it rises substantially for mortgages issued between mid-2004 and mid-2006. These
mortgages have experienced relatively few periods of positive renancing incentives during
their lifetime, as illustrated by the dashed line in Figure 10. This pattern suggests that
mortgage borrowers may have persistent type assignments, not perfectly captured by the
demographic variables in the model, and that levelhead borrowers have disproportionately
exited mortgage cohorts with positive past renancing incentives.
An alternative way to evaluate this possibility is to look at the coe¢ cients on current-
quarter dummies. There are only eight quarters in our sample, so we do not undertake a
formal structural analysis using our whole panel. Instead we undertake a simple analysis of
the way in which the levelhead probabilities implied by the current-quarter dummies move
in relation to renancing rates.
For this purpose, consider a homogeneous continuum of households for which the fraction
of levelheads is t at the beginning of time t. Write the renancing probability at time t
as rLt for levelheads and rW for woodheads. After renancing at time t , the pool of
mortgages is smaller. For each unit mass at the beginning of time t, the mass is now
21Note however that PSA and other US prepayment models apply to all prepayments, not just the re-
nancings we study in this paper.
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(1  rLt)t + (1  rW )(1  t): The levelhead fraction at the end of the period is therefore
t =
(1  rLt)t
(1  rLt)t + (1  rW )(1  t) = f(t; rLt; rW ): (13)
Now suppose that at the end of the period (after renancing but before the beginning of
the next period), a fraction  of all households retain their type while a fraction (1 ) have
their types reassigned randomly. Conditional on type reassignment, the probability that a
household is a levelhead is . Then the new mixing weight on levelheads, at the start of
time t+ 1, is
t+1 = 

t + (1  ) = f(t; rLt; rW ) + (1  ): (14)
The coe¢ cient  captures the persistence of type assignments. When  = 0, type assign-
ments are purely temporary and the incentive history has no e¤ect on the levelhead fraction
which is always  in every period. When  = 1, individual households have permanent
type assignments and the levelhead fraction changes only with selection of levelheads or
woodheads out of the mortgage pool in response to incentives. Intermediate values of 
imply that mortgage renancing incentives a¤ect the levelhead fraction temporarily, but not
permanently.
Given a set of levelhead probabilities t and type-specic renancing probabilities esti-
mated from our model, we can construct t from equation (13) and then estimate equation
(14) by ordinary least squares regression, either imposing that  is the eight-quarter sample
mean of t or estimating it from a free regression intercept. We use three alternative sets
of t and renancing probabilities, based on the simple model of the rst column of Table 7
that includes no demographics; the full model in the right two columns of Table 7, evaluated
at the sample mean for all demographic variables; and the full model where we take the
cross-sectional mean of the levelhead probability and renancing probabilities. With two
treatments of the intercept, these three cases give us six regressions. In all cases we estimate
 between 0.6 and 0.7, and  between 0.1 and 0.15. The appendix provides further details
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of this exercise.
Putting the issuing-quarter and current-quarter results together, there is suggestive evi-
dence of persistence in type assignments that creates burn-out: a tendency for a group of
households to become less responsive to positive renancing incentives over time, as the more
responsive members of the group are selected out. However, the limited time dimension of
our panel dataset prevents us from pursuing this further in this paper.
D. Alternative specications
The mixture model framework allows us quite easily to estimate alternative specications
that vary either the specication of household types or the determinants of mixing proba-
bilities. Here we briey discuss two specications that have some a priori appeal but turn
out to add relatively little explanatory power in our Danish dataset.
First, it is natural to think that some households might be able to compute the static
benets of renancing while being unable to handle the more di¢ cult issues associated with
optionality and the volatility of interest rates.22 We might call such households staticheads
(type h = S). For these households the threshold function is not the expression from ADL,
but instead compares the xed cost of renancing, amortized over the life of a loan, with the







  (1 + )Ti;t) ; (15)
where all parameters are as dened earlier.
When we replace levelheads with staticheads in our model, we nd that the explanatory
power of the model deteriorates and the fraction of staticheads is smaller than that of level-
heads. The reason is that staticheads use a threshold that is too low, since it ignores the
option value of delaying renancing, and thus they tend to make errors of commission rather
22We thank Xavier Gabaix for suggesting that we consider households of this sort.
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than errors of omission. But as we have already noted, errors of commission are quite rare
in our dataset.
Second, we consider the possibility that some households respond to a relatively crude
signal of a renancing opportunity, the issuance of a new mortgage bond with a coupon
2% or 3% below the coupon on the households existing mortgage. Since Danish mortgage
bonds are issued with coupons below market yields, a coupon spread of 2% or 3% does not
imply a raw interest saving of this magnitude, but it is a discrete event that may attract the
attention of less nancially sophisticated households, in part through media coverage.
The issuance of a new bond with a coupon spread of 2% or 3% almost always coincides
with large positive incentives, calculated using the ADL threshold. This means that we
can specify either that the event increases the probability that a household is a levelhead,
or that it increases the probability that woodhead households renance; these specications
are approximately observationally equivalent because the event almost always occurs when
it is rational to renance.
When we include dummies for this event in the mixture model, allowing it to a¤ect the
probability that a household is a levelhead, we nd some evidence of a lagged response to the
event. As shown in the appendix, the model has a somewhat better t to the renancing
spike shown in Figure 6 around an incentive of 1, and the pseudo-R2 increases to 16.6%.
However, the lag lengths are long, particularly for the 2% coupon spread, and demographic
e¤ects appear similar in this model to the model reported in Table 7.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an analysis of sluggish mortgage renancing behavior among
Danish households. The Danish context is particularly advantageous for studying this type
of household behavior because the Danish mortgage system places no restrictions on renanc-
ing that does not involve cash-out, so households that pass up opportunities to substantially
reduce their mortgage costs are not constrained, but are making mistakes in managing their
nances. In addition, the Danish statistical system allows us to measure demographic and
economic characteristics of households, and to use them to predict renancing probabilities.
We distinguish between inattention (a reduced sensitivity to renancing incentives) and
inertia (a lower baseline renancing probability of an inattentive household). We cap-
ture these phenomena using a mixture model of stylized household types, levelheadswho
renance rationally and woodheadswho renance at a xed rate. Demographic charac-
teristics can a¤ect both the proportion of levelheads in the demographic group, our measure
of attention, and the renancing probability of woodheads, our measure of residual inertia.
We nd that inertia is not constant across demographic groups: many household charac-
teristics move inertia and inattention in the same direction, so these attributes are positively
correlated across households, although the correlation is not perfect. Younger, better edu-
cated, and higher-income households have less inertia and less inattention. Interestingly,
nancial wealth and housing wealth have opposite e¤ects, with the least inertia and inatten-
tion among households whose housing wealth is high relative to their nancial wealth. We
also nd suggestive evidence that inattention is a persistent characteristic at the household
level, even after controlling for demographics, so that positive renancing incentives induce
renancing by attentive households and lower the subsequent responsiveness of remaining
mortgage borrowers.
Both our methodology and our ndings have relevance beyond the context of this pa-
per. We believe that mixture models are a promising econometric method for estimat-
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ing the prevalence of behavioral biases in the population, and a useful alternative to the
competing-risks proportional hazard framework of Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) for
modeling heterogeneous prepayment behavior. Our ndings reinforce concerns that nan-
cial capabilities deteriorate late in life (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson 2009) and
that poorer households make worse nancial decisions, contributing to inequality of wealth
(Piketty 2014). This is particularly true because we estimate that renancing mistakes
have substantial costs during our sample period. Finally, our observations of cross-sectional
variation in renancing behavior are consistent with studies of other household nancial
mistakes in other countries (for example Campbell 2006 and Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini
2009b), suggesting that demographic characteristics of households can be used to estimate
their nancial capabilities across di¤erent countries and contexts.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Danish Fixed Rate Mortgages 
The average characteristics in Panel A (B) are calculated using mortgages taken by all households in Denmark with an unchanging number of members, and with a single fixed rate 
mortgage at the beginning of 2010 and 2011.  The first five columns show the statistics broken out by the annual coupon rate on these mortgages, and the final column in each panel 
shows the statistics across all mortgages in each of the periods. The rows show, in order, the number of observations; the fraction refinancing, i.e. the fraction of households who did not 
move house and refinanced their pre-existing mortgage; the fraction refinancing to adjustable rate mortgages (ARM); the fraction refinancing to fixed rate mortgages (FRM); the 
principal remaining in Danish Kroner, i.e., the outstanding principal on the mortgage; the years remaining before the mortgage matures; and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio calculated by 
the mortgage bank. 
 
 Panel A: 2010 
 3% Coupon 4% Coupon 5% Coupon 6% Coupon >6% Coupon Total 
Initial # of observations 8,054 79,929  141,610 44,590 7,515 281,698 
Fraction refinancing 0.039 0.050 0.203 0.556 0.437 0.217 
Fraction refinancing to ARM 0.013 0.024 0.108 0.218 0.153 0.100 
Fraction refinancing to FRM 0.026 0.026 0.095 0.338 0.284 0.117 
Principal remaining (Million DKK) 0.394 0.888 0.947 0.946 0.598 0.905 
Years remaining on mortgage 7.849 21.425 24.552 25.371 22.281 23.256 
Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio  0.242 0.506 0.595 0.640 0.462 0.563 
       
 Panel B: 2011 
 3% Coupon 4% Coupon 5% Coupon 6% Coupon >6% Coupon Total 
Initial # of observations 10,168 110,709 125,369 21,205 4,442 271,893 
Fraction refinancing 0.031 0.041 0.114 0.159 0.117 0.085 
Fraction refinancing to ARM 0.012 0.019 0.060 0.062 0.045 0.037 
Fraction refinancing to FRM 0.018 0.021 0.053 0.097 0.095 0.048 
Principal remaining (Million DKK) 0.479 0.978 0.883 0.591 0.321 0.875 
Years remaining on mortgage 8.662 22.542 23.686 21.785 17.389 22.407 
Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio  0.290 0.557 0.564 0.486 0.299 0.541 





Table 2: Differences in Household Characteristics: Refinancing and Non-Refinancing Households 
 
The first column shows the average of each of the characteristics reported in the rows, pooled across 2010 and 2011 for our entire sample. Columns 2 to 7 report the difference of means 
between refinancing and non-refinancing households, with a negative value indicating a lower mean for refinancing households. Differences are reported either unconditionally across the 
entire sample (Column “All”); conditional on sub-periods (Columns “2010” and “2011”); or conditional on other household characteristics (Columns “Educated“, “Married”, “Wealthy”). 
“Educated” households are defined as the upper 25% of the sample population. “Wealthy” households are those in the upper 25% of net financial wealth in the sample. The rows describe 
the characteristics; single households (male or female) have only one adult living at the address, and represent ~13% of the entire sample. “Married” households have two legally bound 
adults (including registered partnership of same-sex couples). “Children in family” means children are resident in the household. “Immigrant” takes the value of one if there is an 
immigrant in the household. “No educational information” indicates no information provided about this attribute. “Financially literate” takes the value of one if a member of the 
household has a degree in finance, or has had professional financial industry training. “Family financially literate” indicates if (non-household-resident) parents, siblings, in-laws, or 
children of the household are financially literate. “Getting married” indicates a change in marital status over the sample period. “Change to health” indicates when a member of the 
household spent more than 5 days in hospital within the last 12 months, and less than 5 days in hospital in the prior year. “Having children” indicates when households had a child within 
the last 12 months.  “Rank of Age” is the rank of the age of the oldest person living in the household. “Rank of Education” is the rank of the best educated individual in the household. 
“Rank of Income (financial wealth, housing assets)” is the rank of the total income (financial wealth, housing assets) of the household.  All ranks are computed each year across all 
households in the sample. Rank variables are normalized such that they take values between -0.5 and 0.5. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients that are significant at the one, five, and ten 
percent level by standard t-tests, respectively. 
 Difference between Refinancing and Non-Refinancing Households 
 Average All 2010 2011 Educated Married Wealthy
Single male household 0.128 -0.041*** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.015*** -0.027***
Single female household 0.124 -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.015***
Married household 0.638 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.004*** 0.031***
Children in family 0.406 0.102*** 0.108*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.095*** 0.064***
Immigrant 0.072 -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 0.002***
No educational information 0.006 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.000*** -0.002***
Financially literate 0.046 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.020***
Family financially literate 0.129 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.011*** 0.034***
Getting married 0.010 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.004***
Change to health 0.036 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.006***
Having children 0.042 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.019***
Rank of age 0.015 -0.087*** -0.098*** -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.047***
Rank of education  0.004 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.000*** 0.017*** 0.031***
Rank of income 0.008 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.049***
Rank of financial wealth 0.009 -0.094*** -0.102*** -0.082*** -0.100*** -0.909*** -0.003***
Rank of housing value 0.010 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.060***
Region North Jutland 0.124 0.000*** 0.004*** -0.006*** 0.004*** 0.000*** -0.016***
Region Middle Jutland 0.241 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.015***
Region Southern Denmark 0.228 0.002*** -0.004*** 0.018*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.020***
Region Zealand 0.187 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.023*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.004***
Region Copenhagen 0.220 -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.006*** 0.026***
# of observations 2,146,395 ***2,146,395*** 1,067,776*** 1,078,619*** 792,584*** 1,442,780*** 566,032***
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Table 3: Refinancing and Incentives 
The percentiles of the distribution reported in the column headings are calculated across our entire sample of Danish households, pooling data over 2010 and 2011, as 
well as separately by year. The blocks of statistics refer to the interest rate spread in percentage points (defined as the coupon rate on the old mortgage less the yield on 
a newly available mortgage of roughly the same maturity); the threshold level above which refinancing is sensible, taking into account the option value of waiting, 
reported in percentage points, and calculated using the closed form solution in the Agarwal et al. (2013) formula; and the total incentive in percentage points, measured 
as the interest rate spread less the computed threshold level. Within each block of statistics, percentiles are calculated for all households separately for each variable, 
and separately for the sub-populations of refinancing and non-refinancing households. To preserve confidentiality, percentiles are calculated using 5 nearest 
observations to the percentile point. 
 1% 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 99% 
 Interest Rate Spread in Percentage Points
 
All -1.10 -1.01 -0.16 0.23 0.84 1.90 2.94
2010 -1.01 -1.01 -0.18 0.19 0.82 1.82 2.82
2011 -1.10 -1.10 -0.16 0.45 0.90 1.90 3.24
    
 Threshold Level in Percentage Points
 
All 0.51 0.61 0.83 1.08 1.50 2.96 6.92
2010 0.50 0.60 0.81 1.06 1.47 2.83 5.93
2011 0.52 0.62 0.84 1.10 1.52 3.08 8.13
    
 Incentives in Percentage Points
 
All -5.98 -2.66 -1.49 -0.89 -0.25 0.49 1.18
2010 -5.11 -2.59 -1.43 -0.85 -0.22 0.53 1.18
2011 -7.09 -2.74 -1.54 -0.93 -0.29 0.44 1.17





Table 4: Errors of Commission and Omission 
This table shows the incidence of errors of commission and omission, and the characteristics of households who commit errors of commission (refinancing when it is 
suboptimal), and errors of omission (not refinancing when it is optimal). We calculate the levels of incentives to engage in refinancing using the interest rate spread 
between the old and new mortgages less the Agarwal et al. (2013) formula which quantifies the option-value of waiting, and we use these computed incentives (plus 
cutoff levels to control for noise in estimation) to classify errors.  Each column shows cost estimates corresponding to the cutoff levels shown in the column header. 
For example, a cutoff level of 0 (0.25) corresponds to the interest rate spread being exactly equal to the computed Agarwal et al. (2013) threshold level (exceeding the 
Agarwal et al. (2013) threshold level by 25 basis points). Errors of commission (omission) which correspond to each cutoff are computed as the percentage of 
household-quarters with incentives below (above) the negative of the cutoff (the cutoff), who refinance (do not refinance). Columns report the incidence of errors of 
commission and omission for cutoff levels ranging from 0 to 2 percentage points.  
 Level of Cutoff 
  
 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
# Observations (Incentives < -Cutoff) 1,688,215 1,475,545 1,278,737 751,439 362,251 137,457 137,457
# Observations, refinancing 37,297 28,294 22,095 14,340 7,983 2,919 1,014
# Observations, cash out or extend maturity 15,743 12,224 9,715 7,356 4,878 1,921 791
# Observations, errors of commission 21,554 16,070 12,380 6,984 3,105 998 223
Fraction with error of commission 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.002
 
# Observations (Incentives > Cutoff) 458,180 252,336 152,097 100,844 61,309 17,434 6,287
# Observations, errors of omission 411,015 220,084 130,389 83,668 49,456 15,749 5,746




Table 5: Household Characteristics and Refinancing Errors. 
This table reports the mean difference for each demographic characteristic between refinancing and non-refinancing 
households who commit errors of commission and omission for cutoff levels of 0 and 25 basis points. We calculate the 
levels of incentives to engage in refinancing using the interest rate spread between the old and new mortgages less the 
Agarwal et al. (2013) formula which quantifies the option-value of waiting, and we use these computed incentives (plus 
cutoff levels to control for noise in estimation) to classify errors. Positive (negative) numbers under columns marked 
“Increases in Errors of Commission” signify demographic characteristics which are associated with shifts of household-
quarters into (out of) such errors, and similarly positive (negative) numbers under columns marked “Reductions in 
Errors of Commission” signify demographic characteristics which are associated with shifts of household-quarters out 
of (into) such errors. ***, **, and * indicate coefficients that are significant at the one, five, and ten percent level by 
standard t-tests, respectively. 
 
 Cutoff = 0 Cutoff = 0.25 
  
 
Increases in Errors of 
Commission 
Reductions in Errors 
of Omission 
Increases in Errors 
of Commission 
Reductions in Errors of 
Omission 
     
# of observations 1,688,215******** 458,180****** 1,475,545******** 252,336***** 
Single male household -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.041*** 
Single female household -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.031*** 
Married household  0.002***  0.008***  0.011***  0.028*** 
Children in family  0.055***  0.077***  0.064***  0.115*** 
Immigrant -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
Financially literate  0.002***  0.008***  0.002***  0.009*** 
Family financially literate  0.007***  0.019***  0.008***  0.023*** 
No educational information -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
Getting married  0.007***  0.009***  0.007***  0.010*** 
Change to health -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
Having children  0.025***  0.029***  0.026***  0.035*** 
Rank of age  -0.062*** -0.080*** -0.063*** -0.105*** 
Rank of education   0.003***  0.028***  0.006***  0.046*** 
Rank of income  0.018***  0.045***  0.025***  0.072*** 
Rank of financial wealth -0.098*** -0.073*** -0.104*** -0.087*** 
Rank of housing value  0.005***  0.012***  0.016***  0.028*** 
Region North Jutland  0.004***  0.008*** -0.003***  0.007*** 
Region Middle Jutland  0.019***  0.032***  0.014***  0.035*** 
Region Southern Denmark  0.018***  0.001***  0.017*** -0.005*** 
Region Zealand -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
Region Copenhagen -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.022***
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Table 6: Costs of Errors of Omission 
This table estimates the costs of errors of omission. We calculate the levels of incentives to engage in refinancing using the interest rate spread between the old and 
new mortgages less the Agarwal et al. (2013) formula which quantifies the option-value of waiting, and we use these computed incentives (minus cutoff levels to 
control for noise in estimation) to classify errors.  Each column shows cost estimates corresponding to the cutoff levels shown in the column header. For example, a 
cutoff level of 0 (0.25) corresponds to the interest rate spread being exactly equal to the computed Agarwal et al. (2013) threshold level (exceeding the Agarwal et al. 
(2013) threshold level by 25 basis points). Errors of omission occur for household-quarters with incentives above the cutoff, in which refinancing does not occur. The 
panel shows the cost of errors of omission calculated as the foregone annual interest saving (as a percentage of the outstanding mortgage balance) less the amortized 
fixed cost of refinancing given the available interest rates in each quarter of 2010 and 2011. 
 
 
Level of Cutoff 
 
 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2.0
 Cost of errors of omission as % of outstanding mortgage 
All 1.48% 1.86% 2.09% 2.12% 2.50% 3.33% 4.01%
2010 1.42% 1.77% 1.99% 2.49% 2.31% 3.15% 3.70%
2011 1.57% 2.02% 2.27% 2.26% 2.87% 3.54% 4.34%
  
 Cost of errors of omission as % of all outstanding mortgages 
All 0.36% 0.26% 0.21% 0.15% 0.12% 0.04% 0.02%
2010 0.42% 0.31% 0.24% 0.18% 0.08% 0.04% 0.01%
2011 0.29% 0.21% 0.17% 0.12% 0.10% 0.04% 0.02%
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Table 7: Mixture Models 
In these specifications, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for a refinancing in a given quarter, and 0 otherwise. We 
estimate these specifications using all households in Denmark with an unchanging number of members, with a fixed rate mortgage 
in 2010 and 2011. In column 1 we estimate a simple baseline model with no demographics, in which we measure attention as the 
reaction to incentives computed as the interest rate spread between old and new mortgages less the Agarwal et al. (2013) function 
which quantifies the option value of waiting. Columns 2 and 3 estimate two separate specifications in which successively the 
woodhead refinancing probability and the probability of being a levelhead are allowed to depend on demographics as well as the 
dummies capturing issuing and current quarters, and mortgage issuers. Columns 4 and 5 present estimates from a mixture model 
in which both the woodhead refinancing probability and the probability of being a levelhead are allowed to depend on 
demographics and the above dummies.  As before these models include non-linear transformations, f(x), of several of the rank 
control variables in addition to their levels, where f(x) =  √2ݔଶ. Pseudo R2 is calculated using the formula R2 = 1- L1/L0, where L1 
is the log likelihood from the given model and L0 is the log likelihood from a model including only woodheads with a constant 
refinancing probability.  ***, **, and * indicate coefficients that are significant at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively, 





















Single male household 0.065*** 0.177*** -0.044*** 0.187***
Single female household 0.166*** 0.192***  0.108*** 0.158***
Married household 0.069*** 0.025***  0.075*** 0.001***
Children in family -0.030*** -0.064*** -0.085*** -0.051***
Immigrant -0.215*** -0.142*** -0.193*** -0.091***
Financially literate 0.119*** 0.103***  0.096*** 0.097***
Family financially literate 0.062*** 0.063***  0.046*** 0.055***
No education information -0.376*** -0.250*** -0.501*** -0.107***
Getting married 0.250*** 0.183***  0.362*** 0.094**
Change to health 0.005*** -0.008*** -0.062*** -0.008***
Having children 0.196*** 0.132***  0.242*** 0.067***
Region of Northern Jutland 0.237*** 0.249***  0.084*** 0.272***
Region of Middle Jutland 0.290*** 0.291***  0.141*** 0.293***
Region of Southern Denmark 0.255*** 0.207***  0.228*** 0.146***
Region of Zealand -0.015*** -0.012** -0.046*** 0.003***
  
Demeaned rank of: -0.447*** -0.373*** -0.358*** -0.339***
Age 0.037*** 0.076*** -0.041** 0.117***
Length of education 0.026*** 0.090*** -0.161*** 0.212***
Income -1.300*** -0.660*** -1.438*** -0.206***
Financial wealth 0.652*** 0.263***  0.510*** 0.156***
Housing wealth  
  
Non-linear transformation f(x), x is the demeaned rank of:  
Age 0.876*** 0.807***  1.023*** 0.507***
Length of education -0.663*** -0.516*** -0.672*** -0.312***
Income -0.365*** -0.367*** -0.357*** -0.346***
Financial wealth 0.138*** 0.300***  0.019*** 0.312***
Housing wealth -0.144*** 0.178*** -0.163*** 0.182***
  
Intercept: Woodhead Refinancing Probability -4.655*** -4.540*** -4.882*** -5.862***
Intercept: Response of Levelheads 0.940*** 1.193*** 0.798***  1.117***
Intercept: Proportion of Levelheads -1.752*** -2.166*** -2.317*** -2.262***
  
Issuing Quarter Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Current Quarter Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Mortgage Issuer Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
  
  
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.127 0.151 0.159
Log Likelihood -319,393.4 -308,685.8 -300,244.6 -297,198.3
Observations 2,146,395 2,146,395 2,146,395 2,146,395
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Figure 1: Baseline Mixture Model 
This figure plots refinancing probabilities from the baseline mixture model estimated in Table 7 column 1 with homogeneous 
levelheads and woodheads. The solid line in the top panel of the figure shows the observed refinancing probability by incentive 
levels. The remaining lines show the model-predicted refinancing probabilities; (i) for woodheads (short dash and dot), (ii) for 
levelheads (long dash and dot), and finally (iii) the model predicted refinancing probability (long dash), which is the weighted 
average refinancing probability of woodheads and levelheads.   
 
Figure 2: Histogram of Estimated Mortgage Termination Probabilities. 
This figure shows our estimates of mortgage termination probabilities.  To compute these estimates, we fit a simple probit model 
to realized mortgage terminations using all households with a single fixed-rate mortgage, conditioning the dummy variable for a 
termination on household characteristics. We plot the fitted values from this probit model, with a dark dashed line at 10%, which 
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Figure 3: The History of 30-year Danish Mortgage Rates from 2003 to 2013 
 
Figure 4: Refinancing Activity by Old Mortgage Coupon Rates 
This figure illustrates the history of refinancing activity in our sample of Danish fixed-rate mortgages.  In each plot, the bars (left 
vertical axis) represent the number of refinancing households in the quarter, while the solid line (right vertical axis) shows the 
history of the mortgage interest rate. The top panel shades each of the bars according to the coupon rate on the old mortgage from 
which households refinance.  The bottom panel shades each of the bars according to the coupon rate on the new mortgage into 
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Figure 5: Refinancing and Incentives. 
This figure plots the number of household-quarters observations (left vertical axis) and the fraction of total household-quarters 
refinancing (right vertical axis) at each level of refinancing incentives shown on the horizontal axis.  The plot uses 20-basis-point 
intervals for incentives. 
  
Figure 6: Refinancing probability by Types, and the Fraction of Refinancing. 
This figure plots refinancing probabilities from the complete mixture model with levelheads and woodheads estimated in Table 7, 
as a function of refinancing incentives constructed in various ways. The solid line in the top panel of the figure shows the 
observed (raw) refinancing probability, the dashed line with long dashes shows the model-predicted refinancing probability, and 
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Figure 7: Marginal Effects of Ranked Variables on Levelhead Probability 
This figure shows the marginal change in the probability of being a levelhead as a function of the ranked variables of age, 
education, income, financial wealth and housing wealth, fixing all other explanatory variables at their unconditional in-sample 
means, from the complete mixture model with levelheads and woodheads estimated in Table 7.   
 
Figure 8: Marginal Effects of Ranked Variables on Woodhead Refinancing Probability 
This figure shows the marginal change in the refinancing probability of woodheads as a function of the ranked variables of age, 
education, income, financial wealth and housing wealth, fixing all other explanatory variables at their unconditional in-sample 



























































Figure 9: Fitted Refinancing Probability by Issuing Quarter  
This figure plots the predicted refinancing probability of woodheads (y-axis) by issuing quarter (x-axis) using the estimated mixture model in 
Table 7, predicted at the mean for all other variables than the relevant issuing quarter. The first issuing quarter is issuing quarters within our 
refinancing period 2009-2011. The fraction of periods with positive incentives for each issuing quarter is plotted as the line and uses the scaled 
on the right axis.  
 
Figure 10: Fitted Refinancing Probability by Issuing Quarter, Heterogeneous Types  
This figure plots the levelhead probability (left y-axis) by issuing quarter (x-axis) using the estimated mixture model in Table 7, predicted at the 
mean for all other variables than the relevant issuing quarter. The second line plots the fraction of periods with positive incentives using the 
Agarwal et al. (2013) formula for each issuing quarter and uses the scale on the right axis. The first issuing quarter is issuing quarters within our 
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